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European transport industry deregulation: an analytical investigation 
of the impact on incumbents’ managerial efficiency 1988-2015 
 
 
Abstract 
  
Purpose  
This paper examines the impact of deregulation on the European transport industry, in the form 
of privatization, on the managerial efficiency of a panel of deregulated transport companies. 
 Design/methodology/approach 
This research examines a dataset of 25 deregulated transport companies from a sample of 12 EU 
nations from 1988 to 2015. Some studies have analyzed deregulation by using non-parametric 
models. However, only a limited number of studies focus on the impact of deregulation on the 
managerial efficiency. This study answers two questions: whether deregulation, in the form of 
privatization, in the transport sector has any effect on the managerial efficiency, on the 
profitability and on the investment decisions of the firm, and whether this premise is robust 
enough across the European transport industry. This study formulates a multivariate regression 
framework utilizing data from major privatized European transport companies. The final panel 
includes 25 companies, from 12 EU-MS for the period 1988-2015 equaling 375 firm-year 
observations based on a rigorous selection methodology.  
  
Findings 
The study confirms that transport companies, post-privatization, are more efficient regarding 
operating efficiency and profitability. We find no evidence that deregulation improves 
investment efficiency.  
 Social implications  
The study addresses the regulators’ dilemma, whether to deregulate or not, by focusing on 
analyzing the improvement of the managerial efficiency.   
 Originality/value 
This study contributes to the transport industry management literature in three ways. Firstly, we 
update the literature of the economic theory of regulation with an empirical examination which 
covers the latest years across the EU Member States. Secondly, we introduce a comparison of 
the effects of deregulation on different components of the managerial efficiency, namely, 
investment, profitability, and operating efficiency of the incumbents in the EU transport industry. 
Thirdly, we examined deregulation by using two approaches: a traditional one where 
deregulation is a dummy variable assessing the overall effect on incumbents’ efficiency 
performance; a novel approach where the OECD’s deregulation index is used to measure the 
regulation intensity, accounting also for industry-wide impact assessment. This two-sided 
approach increases the robustness of the results.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Research issue 
Historically, the European transport market has been intensly regulated. The deregulation 
process of the EU transport market, since the mid-1980s, has promoted the competition among 
transport service providers and contributed to increased transport flows (Lafontaine & Valeri, 
2009). The main argument in favor of deregulation (Sheshinski, 2003), is that deregulation has 
clear benefits both for the deregulated company and for the entire transport sector. The 
European Commission (EC hereafter) has acknowledged the need to further upgrade the 
transport industry by removing obstacles of administrative or regulatory nature (Islam, et al., 
2016).  
However, the critique of the impact of the deregulation seems not always positive. Research 
suggests that in the short run, privatized companies will attempt to optimize their operating 
efficiency and profitability (Cantos, 1999). However in the longer term, these companies appear 
to be risk averse and do not increase their capital expenditure; in other words, they don’t invest 
more compared to pre-privatization (Lafontaine and Valeri, 2009). Moreover, extant literature 
shows the discrepancy in approaches towards the efficiency performance (Cantos et al., 2012). 
Some empirical literature uses operational efficiency performance relating to financial indexes 
such as cost, productivity, and profitability (e.g., (Cantos, et al., 2012); (Gulati & Kumar, 2017)); 
some use managerial efficiency relating to investment and revenue (e.g., (Rao, et al., 2010)).  
Given the above discussion in extant literature, this research aims to further examine the 
impact of deregulation of the European transport market, specifically on the managerial 
efficiency performance of the European transport companies.  
1.2 Research questions 
The research questions this study sets, aim to quantify the relationship between deregulation 
and its effect on the privatized firms’ managerial efficiency, including operating efficiency, 
profitability and capital expenditure as measured by certain financial metrics. This study focuses 
exactly on this premise, challenging whether:  
i. Deregulation in the form of privatization on the transport sector has any effect on the 
operating efficiency, profitability and investment decisions (capital expenditure) of a firm,  
ii. The previous premise is robust enough by analyzing the effect of the intensity of 
regulation in the European transport industry, as measured by OECD, on operating 
efficiency, profitability and investment decisions (capital expenditure) of a firm. 
To test the above, we use publicly available data and refine a sample of 25 major deregulated 
transport companies in the 12 EU member states. This paper analyses the impact of deregulation 
on European transport companies. The panel of deregulated European transport companies that 
have experienced a significant deregulatory shock was selected for the analysis. 
1.3 Intended contributions 
We expect to contribute to the knowledge of transport deregulation by analyzing the impact 
of deregulation on the managerial efficiency. Firstly, we update the regulation literature by our 
empirical examination which covers the period from 1988 to 2015 across EU Member States (EU-
MS hereafter). Secondly, this paper addresses an important gap in the literature by analyzing the 
post-privatization managerial efficiency in the European transport industry. More specifically, we 
compared the effects of deregulation on different aspects of the managerial efficiency of the 
incumbent companies, namely, investment activity, profitability, and operating efficiency. 
Thirdly, we examined deregulation by using two approaches: a traditional one where 
deregulation is a dummy variable assessing the overall effect on incumbents’ efficiency 
performance and a novel approach where we used OECD’s deregulation index to account for the 
regulation intensity especially considering industry wide effects of deregulation. This two-sided 
approach is novel as it is expected to increase the robustness of the results.  
This study is unique in a number of innovations. To the best our knowledge, this study is the 
first one that systematically uses OECD’s ETCR (Energy, Transport and Communication Regulation 
intensity) deregulation index (OECD, 2015) to improve the robustness of the results significantly 
and offers an alternative to measuring the deregulation impact. Τhe study sets up a panel of 
transport industry entities and compares their efficiency pre and post-deregulation. Additionally, 
this study is distinctive because the collected data come from transport entities in developed 
countries only and more specifically from European Union Member States (EU MS hereafter). 
Previous studies are either country-specific (Martin & Parker, 1995), (Eckel, et al., 1997), etc.), or 
focus on transition economies / countries (Galal, et al., 1994), (Ramanurti, 1997), (Wallsten, 
2001) , or include more than one industries such as financial services and communications 
together (Boubakri & Cosset, 1998), (Boylaud, 2000), (D’Souza & Megginson, 1999). 
The remainder of the paper consists of four sections. Section two reviews the theoretical 
ground and develops hypotheses. Section three articulates the methods and this is followed by 
section four which conducts the analysis and presents the results. The final section concludes our 
findings, contributes to theory, discusses the implications to policymakers and discusses the 
limitations and potential for further research. 
2. Literature Review and hypotheses 
2.1 Theoretical ground 
Deregulation has been introduced to many industries or sectors such as energy (Davis & Wolfram, 
2011), financial services (Noulas, 2001; Gulati and Kumar, 2017) and transportation (Dempsey, 
2008) after the mid-1980; examples of deregulation involve liberalization of market control such 
as pricing, entry and exit barriers (Lafontaine and Valeri, 2009). This minimization of control is 
reflected in the definition by Waterson:  "[regulation is defined as] control of an industrial activity 
by government, in the sense of actions, such as restrictions on firms entering the industry, 
constraints on firms actually in the industry, or both” (Waterson, 1988).  We specify deregulation 
in this research in the form of privatization, mainly through transfer of ownership (partial or 
entire) in an industry or in some sectors (Andersen, 1992), i.e. the transfer of ownership of assets 
and or of entire undertakings to a third party, who will in turn restrict societal and similar 
management objectives in lieu of profit-maximizing objectives. 
In the microeconomic theory, it is essentially axiomatic (Bailey and Baumol, 1984) that 
monopoly and regulation prevent fair and competitive market environment and generate sub-
optimal efficiency for the whole industry and business entities in the industry. We apply The 
Theory of Economic Regulation (Stigler, 1971) to investigate the effect of deregulation on 
managerial efficiency, where deregulation is a political act, and managerial efficiency is the 
expected economic effect of the political act. Therefore, liberalization and privatization, among 
other deregulatory initiatives, both help to remove inefficiencies, allowing the ‘invisible hand’ to 
work in order to improve the performance of businesses (Bailey and Baumol, 1984). The 
economic theory of regulation provides theoretical ground for the empirical analysis of the 
evidence in the EU transportation companies. The transportation system, which is the current 
research context, is designed to be efficient, solid and financially stable. However, inherent 
complexities, limitations and network abnormalities induce inefficiencies in the system, thus 
regulations were previously used in order to correct among others (i) market failures including 
externalities (e.g., health, safety, and environmental risks), (ii) asymmetric information, (iii) 
market power, and (iv) long term system viability.  
Most governments adopted deregulation initiatives so as to open the market to competition. 
The expectation is to maximize the sector’s contribution to the country’s gross domestic product 
(GDP) and to the competitiveness as well as to improve employment levels. Hence, governments 
have traditionally focused on achieving specific goals, such as to (i) improve firms’ profitability, 
(ii) improve firms’ operating efficiency and (iii) increase firms’ capital investment spending.  
At this point, it is important to define and distinct the operational and managerial efficiency. 
Operational efficiency is defined as the output gained per unit of input to run a business 
operation (Coelli, et al., 2005). Inputs vary from monetary units and people to even time or effort. 
Outputs typically vary from money (e.g., revenue, margin, or cash) and customer loyalty to 
market penetration and production. Data envelopment analysis is a linear programming method 
that is used to measure the operational efficiency of decision-making units from the technical 
viewpoint. Adapted from Bates & Sykes (1962) and Pi & Timme (1993), managerial efficiency in 
this study is defined as the processes, procedures, and communication that the leadership of an 
entity uses so as to make the entity function as per the expectations. The managerial efficiency 
works at a higher level than the operational efficiency and is often assessed by financial, 
corporate, operational and accounting measures. In other words, operational efficiency reflects 
components of managerial efficiency and we consider operational as part of the managerial 
efficiency. Operational efficiency relates to the short-term performance of a firm. Contrary to 
that, managerial efficiency focuses on the long-term, strategic aspects of the firm that improve 
its performance. Hence, managerial efficiency is more appropriate for this study in order to 
assess the effects of deregulation on the firm-level performance in the EU transport market. In 
order to make it easier for the reader, we adopt the term ‘operating efficiency’ for those 
indicators that are part of the managerial efficiency, contrasting thus with the technical aspects 
of operational efficiency. 
2.2 State of the Art 
Extant literature has investigated the operational efficiency of the railway undertakings post-
deregulation (e.g.  (Bogetoft & Hougaard, 1999), (Cantos, et al., 1999), (Asmild, et al., 2003), 
(Asmild, et al., 2009)), the productivity at both an aggregate industrial level as well as at the 
individual level, e.g. (Cantos, et al., 1999), (Powell, 2012), (Ajayi, et al., 2010) and the technical 
efficiency of a specific sub-sector like the port sector (Tongzon & Heng, 2005). In the same 
theoretical framework, Lubulwa’s General Equilibrium Model (Lubulwa, 1988) contested the 
Wheeler-Gilmour hypothesis (Wheeler & Gilmour, 1974) that “in the event of deregulation, it 
would be unlikely that there would be massive movement away from the railways to the road 
operators” by analyzing the macroeconomic situation in Australia and comparing the post-
deregulation industry dynamics.  
These studies use theoretical, non-parametric models and focus primarily on the technical 
aspects of efficiency, without adequately considering the managerial efficiency. Based on a 
vigorous literature review, there is a limited set of studies on the impact of deregulation on the 
business side of transport companies and more specifically on the managerial decision-making 
process. Studies that focus on the business side include Dempsey’s analysis (Dempsey, 2008) of 
the efficiency at the strategic level, analyzing the financial performance of the airline industry 
since the sectorial deregulation in the USA. Koliousis et al. (Koliousis, et al., 2013) analyzed the 
impact of the road transport deregulation on the total production of the European short sea 
shipping sector, concluding that regulatory reforms and the provision of financial stimuli to road 
freight transport companies have negative effects on short sea shipping total turnover and 
production. Furthermore, Cowie and Loynes, (Cowie & Loynes, 2012) examined the British 
railway infrastructure costs over the period 1980–2009 and showed that for example total 
operating costs returned to pre-privatization levels by the end of the study period (up to 2010). 
Regarding the specific case of managerial efficiency, relevant literature (Megginson & Netter, 
2001) focuses on estimating different financial metrics and sampling data from panels of entities 
operating in various sectors or industries. For example, Megginson et al. (Megginson, et al., 
1994), examine the firm-level effects of privatization using a large sample of companies across 
different industries and different countries. Scheraga et al. (Scheraga, et al., 1994) used a pooled 
matched-sample for the years 1977 - 1987 to examine the strategic adaptability of motor carriers, 
post-deregulation vis-à-vis financial mobility and performance. Galal et al., (Galal, et al., 1994) 
compared the actual performance of 12 large firms (mixing airlines and regulated utilities) post-
privatization in the UK, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico and showed an increase in the revenues, welfare 
gains and employee stability. Martin and Parker (Martin & Parker, 1995) used specific indicators 
like rate of return on capital employed and annual growth of value-added per employee-hour to 
show that in 11 privatized UK firms (1981–88) the performance was improved. Similarly, Eckel et 
al. (Eckel, et al., 1997) analyzed the effect of privatizing British Airways on the competitors’ stock 
prices and additionally documented the fares’ trends on competitive routes and found that both 
stock prices and fares fell by at least 7%. In their analysis, La Porta and López-de Silanes (La Porta 
& Lopez-de-Silanes, 1999) compared the performance of privatized Mexican firms with industry 
matched firms regarding performance, output, and employment. Wallsten’s (Wallsten, 2001) 
econometric analysis helps understand the effects of telecommunications’ reforms in developing 
countries by using a panel of 30 African and Latin American countries from 1984–97. Laurin and 
Bozec (Laurin & Bozec, 2001) focused on two rail carriers before and after the 1995 privatization 
and compared accounting ratios for 17 years between 1981–97. Similarly, Dewenter and 
Malatesta (Dewenter & Malatesta, 2001) adopt a parametric model to examine profitability, 
financial leverage, and labor intensity aspects of the firms in a cross-industry, cross-country 
sample of companies. These aspects are measured using conventional accounting ratios, 
including return on sales, return on assets, and return on equity. Previous literature suggested 
that there are significant increases post-deregulation in non-transition economies and sectors 
like utilities, energy, airlines, banking ( (Megginson, et al., 1994), (Boubakri & Cosset, 1998), 
(D’Souza & Megginson, 2000)). This study extends the research by analyzing the impact of 
deregulation on EU transport companies. 
2.3 Hypotheses 
Deregulation is expected to have a significant impact on the firm’s managerial efficiency, 
regarding increased profitability, improved operating efficiency and growth in investment 
activity. Sheshinski (Sheshinski, 2003) states that the most important implication is that “publicly 
owned enterprises in competitive environments would not perform better than privately owned 
companies in the same circumstances regarding profitability, and may perform worse.” 
Additionally, Sheshinski expects important efficiency gains from the change in ownership 
structure in competitive sectors as well as improvement in profitability. The focus of this paper 
is to draw insights from a specific regulatory shock that has an identifiable time trace and 
application so as to understand the effects of regulatory reform on firm profitability, efficiency, 
and investment. More precisely, we test the following hypotheses: 
H1: Deregulation enhances operating efficiency of a firm. This effect is expected because 
regulated firms have fewer incentives for managing efficiently their operations and face a lower 
threat of costly reorganization than deregulated firms do in a more competitive environment 
(Megginson, et al., 1994), (Boubakri & Cosset, 1998) , (D’Souza & Megginson, 1999), (Sheshinski, 
2003). 
H2: Deregulation improves the profitability of a firm. This effect is expected because regulatory 
practices force firms operate inefficiently (Megginson, et al., 1994), (Boubakri & Cosset, 1998) 
(D’Souza & Megginson, 1999), (Sheshinski, 2003) whereas in other industries, regulation may 
support profitability by insulating firms from market forces and competition. Hence, this research 
examines this variation across different sectors of the transport industry and more precisely 
whether deregulation affects positively the profitability of the incumbents.   
H3: Deregulation intensifies investment activity of a firm. Extant literature suggests that 
deregulated companies tend to expand their investment activity (Megginson, et al., 1994), 
(Boubakri & Cosset, 1998), (D’Souza & Megginson, 1999), (Sheshinski, 2003). The intensified 
investment activity may be due to any of the following reasons: (i) the deregulated firms’ 
enhanced access to debt and equity markets (Ovtchinnikov, 2010), (ii) the need for “catch up” 
investments, i.e. investments to replace obsolete or inefficient equipment which is necessary to 
compete in a competitive market, or (iii) the inherent entrepreneurial drive in deregulated firms 
for increased focus on growth opportunities and hence increased investment needs. On the other 
hand, it is commonly argued that regulated firms invest more due to the implicit support and 
borrowing power offered by the government or even some governments’ tendency to subsidize 
regulated firms’ output to achieve socially desirable targets.  
3. Methodology 
3.1  Sample  
3.1.1 Sample industries 
The Privatization Barometer Database (Privatization Barometer - Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, 
2016) identifies privatization transactions that took place since 1977 in various industries. We 
selected the transport industry and more precisely sectors like freight transport or combined 
passenger/freight transport, ports, airports, companies engaging in marine cargo handling, road 
concessions, trucking, postal / courier services, rail, marine transportation and ferry 
transportation. Table I presents the transport sectors included in the sample, based on their SIC 
Codes. This table includes deregulatory initiatives taking place after 1985 (as per the privatization 
transaction referred). We selected our sample companies based on the following deregulatory 
initiatives: 1) entry/exit barriers, 2) price or rate regulation, 3) state owning (or majority 
ownership or “golden shares”) of the main incumbent, 4) obligatory separation (vertical 
disintegration) between infrastructure and operations, and 5) the market being a natural 
monopoly or an induced natural monopoly or essential facilities.  
Table I. Sample Industries selected (based on SIC Code) 
Sector (SIC) Description 
4212 Local Trucking Without Storage 
4213 Trucking, Except Local 
4215 Courier Services, except by Air 
4412 Deep Sea Foreign Transportation of Freight 
4482 Ferries 
4491 Marine Cargo Handling 
4499 Water Transportation Services, not elsewhere classified 
4581 Airports, Flying Fields, and Airport Terminal Services 
4731 The arrangement of Transportation of Freight and Cargo 
4785 Fixed Facilities and Inspection and Weighing Services for Motor Vehicle 
Transportation, Toll Roads, highway bridges, etc. 
4789 Transportation Services, not elsewhere classified 
3.1.2 Sample companies 
The primary data cover practically all major regulated transport companies in the EU-27 member 
states. At least one company from each transport sub-sector (based on SIC number identification) 
is participating. We selected and included firms from both “Old Europe” and from “New Europe” 
(i.e., EU-12 AND EU-12+15). Notably, these firms were involved in major privatization 
transactions in the selected sectors since the mid-1980s and we identified those through the 
Privatization Barometer’s database1. Therefore, our panel data includes privatized firms with 
various degrees of privatization, making it one of the most comprehensive in comparison to 
similar samples which focus solely on pre- or post-privatization data. Table II presents the sample 
firms, their country of incorporation, the sample period for which reliable financial data were 
available and their sector classification, following the SIC classification. The year of privatization 
refers to the first year in which a change in a firm’s ownership took place.   
 
Table II. Sample Set: Privatized Transport Companies participating in the Panel 
Company Country Sample 
Period 
Year of 
Privatization 
Sector 
(SIC) 
Oesterreichische Post AG Austria 2002-2014 2006 4215 
Flughafen Wien AG Austria 1991-2014 1992 4581 
bpost SA Belgium 2006-2014 2013 4215 
Kobenhavns Lufthavne Denmark 1992-2014 1994 4581 
Finnlines OYJ Finland 1989-2014 2006 4412 
Autoroutes du Sud de la France SA France 1999-2014 2002 4789 
SANEF SA France 2001-2013 2005 4789 
Societe Des Autoroutes Paris-Rhin-
Rhone 
France  2001-2014 2004 4789 
Aeroports de Paris France 1988-2014 2006 4581 
Societe Nationale Maritime Corse 
Mediterranee SA 
France 2006-2011 2006 4482 
Hamburger Hafen und Logistik AG Germany 2004-2014 2007 4213 
Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services 
Worldwide 
Germany 1998-2014 2001 4581 
Deutsche Post AG Germany 1990-2014 2006 4215 
Piraeus Port Authority Greece 2000-2014 2003 4491 
                                                     
1 The Privatization Barometer (PB; http://www.privatizationbarometer.net) is a non-profit research institution launched in 2003 
by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. PB is an independent source on privatization reporting being also an official provider of 
privatization data to OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) and to the World Bank.  
Thessaloniki Port Authority Greece 1998-2014 2001 4491 
Trieste Marine Terminal SpA Italy 2007-2013 2010 4491 
Autostrade SpA Italy 1988-2002 1999 4785 
NordCargo Srl Italy 2006-2013 2008 4212 
Rigas Transporta Flote A/S Latvia 1995-2003 1996 4499 
Latvijas kugnieciba Latvia 1999-2014 2002 4412 
PostNL NV Netherlands 1996-2014 2004 4215 
Transinsular - Transportes Maritimos 
Insula 
Portugal 1988-2009 1990 4731 
Brisa Auto-Estradas de Portugal SA Portugal 1994-2013 1997 4785 
CTT-Correios de Portugal SA Portugal 2010-2014 2013 4215 
Royal Mail UK 2010-2015 2013 4215 
Source: (Privatization Barometer - Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, 2016) 
The companies in the dataset were privatized, the sectors were deregulated and the market was 
opened to anyone interested in participating2. From this sample, two sectors, namely 41.11 (local 
and suburban transit, i.e., public urban transport) and 45.12 (air transportation, scheduled, i.e., 
airline carriers) were excluded, since it is deemed that deregulation in those sectors has led to a 
more cumbersome framework that has artificially increased regulatory restrictions. More 
precisely, although public urban transportation has been deregulated and concessions have been 
awarded, the markets across EU are heavily regulated in a multilayered approach in almost all of 
the cases. The central or the local government awards specific contracts for specific routes and 
new entrants are excluded from participating in the market (entry barriers) unless awarded a 
permit from an Independent Regulatory Agency (IRA) or the Government, usually for more than 
one concessions. Additionally, the rates (rents) are usually the focus of political debates, leading 
to increased pressure to the operator to either reduce or retain the same prices and the local 
                                                     
2 We acknowledge that post deregulation and post privatization, the legislative environment may produce a stricter, 
artificial regulation due to compliance requirements. 
governments usually take advantage of such companies to accomplish their employment 
objectives. As for the airline industry, the inherent peculiarities of the market have created issues 
affecting the sustainability of the carriers themselves. The main peculiarities include the high 
share of fuel cost in the cost structure and the labor conventions or restrictions, with which each 
carrier has to abide. The significant volatility of the former and the country-specific restrictions 
of the latter have affected the pricing models, which in an intensely competitive environment 
has led many companies out of the market. After evaluating the financial data, we considered 
more appropriate to exclude these companies from the sample.  
3.2 Variables and measures 
This study examines three main aspects measuring managerial efficiency of the firms in its 
sample: operating efficiency, profitability and investment activity (Megginson et al., 1994). 
Accordingly, three key financial variables are used as empirical measures of managerial 
efficiency, namely, net income margin, revenues to the asset, and capital expenditure (CAPEX) to 
the asset. Financial and accounting data were obtained from Bloomberg.  Table III describes the 
definitions for the main variables used in this analysis. 
Table III. Definition of variable 
Type of variable Variable Definition 
Explained variable Net Income 
Margin 
The ratio of a company's net profits to revenues, 
indicating a company's core profitability and showing 
how much of each currency unit earned by the 
company is translated into profits. 
Revenues to 
Assets 
The ratio of revenue to total assets, indicating how 
efficient management is at using its assets to 
generate earnings in the form of revenues.  
CAPEX to Assets The ratio of capital expenditure to the company 
assets, showing the firm’s investment activity, and 
illustrating initiatives undertook by the company to 
maintain or expand its scope and operations.  
Explanatory variable Deregulation 
index 
A dummy variable, indicating whether the firm was 
privatized: Yes=1; No=0.  
Control variable GDP growth National GDP growth percentage 
Country The country as a dummy variable 
Sector The sector as a dummy variable 
Time Time as a dummy variable 
 
Data regarding the OECD indicators of regulation in Energy, Transport & Communications 
(ETCR) were obtained through OECD (Table IV). OECD (OECD, 2015) has developed a database 
that monitors the regulation in the energy, transport and communications markets from the mid-
1970s until 2013. This is the first systematic approach, which measures a predefined set of 
economic regulations. Concerning the structure of the OECD Index, this is composed (OECD, 
2015) of sector-specific components. This study focuses on four relevant components, i.e.  
Railways, Road Freight, Airline Industry, and Post. More precisely, the railways sector component 
includes assessing the following indicators: (a) Entry (legal barriers to entry in passenger and 
freight businesses), (b) Vertical integration (the degree of separation between competitive and 
non-competitive activities), (c) the Public ownership (i.e. the share of government-owned stakes 
in major companies), and (d) the Market structure (in terms of market share of dominant 
operator).  The Road Freight sector component includes the following indicators, (a) Entry and 
(b) Prices (the extent of price regulation). The Airline Industry component includes (a) Entry 
(entry in domestic and in international routes) and (b) Public ownership (i.e. the share of a 
government to a -major- airline). For the Postal sector component, the indicators assessed 
include (a) Entry (the extent of entry regulation in the basic letter, basic parcel, and courier 
services) and (b) Public ownership (ownership from the government in companies dealing with a 
basic letter, basic parcel, and courier services).  
Concerning the EU, data are available for all EU-27 countries for the period 1975 - 2013 and 
the values range from 0 (indicating minimum restrictions, i.e., free market) to 6 (indicating a 
highly regulated market). In this analysis, the average score of the indicators (entry, public 
ownership, market structure prices, and vertical integration indices) for all transport sectors for 
each year and each country was used as a proxy for the level of deregulation in each country. 
This approach was driven by the lack of individual observations for specific sub-sectors (e.g., for 
ports, for airports, for rail operators, etc), however is effectively illustrates the key statistics and 
reveals the different state of regulation for each country.  
Finally, data regarding the growth rate of real historical GDP (Gross Domestic Product) for all 
countries involved in this study, were obtained through the World Bank and the IMF databases 
(World Bank World Development Indicators and IMF’s International Financial Statistics). GDP 
growth has been used as a control variable based on a number of studies (Han & Fang, 2000), 
(Ishutkina & Hansman, 2008) (Gao, et al., 2016) (Beyzatlar, et al., 2014) that show the relationship 
between GDP growth and the transport industry activity.  
3.3 Model Formulation 
To account for exogenous factors affecting the key financial metrics and hence to better 
understand the causality and the effect of deregulation on a firm’s strategic decisions, a Fixed 
Effects Model (FEM) has been developed, using the panel data across years, countries and firms, 
testing the three hypotheses, described in detail below. According to the FEM theory, the 
intercept in the regression model is allowed to differ among individuals to reflect the unique 
feature of individual units, which is captured by dummy variables (Gujarati, 2006), (Greene, 
2018). FEM is an appropriate method in those situations when the number of cross-sectional 
units is large, which is the case of this research. In comparison with Panel regression models, FEM 
is a commonly used method to deal with problems such as autocorrelation and cross-correlation 
associated with cross-sectional united at the same point in time. 
The model for this research is adapted from Megginson et al. (1994), which has been 
applied in similar empirical studies. For instance, D’Souza and Megginson (D’Souza & Megginson, 
1999) used this model to examine the financial and operating performance of privatized firms 
during the 1990s. Results indicate significant increases in the mean and median levels of 
profitability, real sales, operating efficiency, and dividends post-privatization, as well as 
significant decreases in mean and median leverage ratios and insignificant decreases in the mean 
and median employment levels and capital investment ratios. 
Function1 (F1) is developed to test H1, the effect of deregulation on the managerial 
efficiency of privatized EU transport firms, as measured by the metric Revenues to Assets. The 
model specification is given as the following function (F1): 
𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔𝒊𝒕 = 𝒂𝟎 + 𝒂𝟏 ∗ 𝑫𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒙𝒊𝒕 +  𝒂𝟐 ∗ 𝑮𝑫𝑷 𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒕 +
∑ 𝝁𝒊𝒏𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒚𝒏𝒏 +  ∑ 𝝀𝒊𝒋𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒋 + ∑ 𝝂𝒕𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕𝒋                                                                         (F1)  
Where Revenue to Assetsit is the Revenue to Assets metric of firm i in year t. Deregulation Indexit 
is a dummy variable, which equals to 1 if firm i was privatized in year t and subsequent years (t+1, 
t+2, …), 0 otherwise. GDP Growthit corresponds to the real GDP Growth for Country i in year t, 
Country, Sector and Year are dummy variables and 𝜺𝒊𝒕 is the error term. Hence, the analysis 
controls for time-series variation in the general level of economic activity (such as changes in 
firms’ attributes arising from fluctuations in economic activity), as well as for country-, sector- 
and year-specific attributes that may confound comparison pre- and post-deregulation. 
Similarly, Function 2 (F2) tests H2, the effect of deregulation on the profitability of privatized 
European transport firms as measured by the financial metric Net Income Margin:  
𝑵𝒆𝒕 𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆 𝑴𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒕 = 𝒂𝟎 + 𝒂𝟏 ∗ 𝑫𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒙𝒊𝒕 +  𝒂𝟐 ∗ 𝑮𝑫𝑷 𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒕 +
∑ 𝝁𝒊𝒏𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒚𝒏𝒏 + ∑ 𝝂𝒕𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕                                                                                                         (F2)                                        
 
Where Net Income Marginit is the ratio of Net Income to Revenues of firm i in year t (all other 
variables are the same as with F1). 
Function 3 (F3) tests H3, the effect of deregulation on the privatized EU transport firms’ 
investment activity, which is measured by the financial metric CAPEX to Assets:   
𝑪𝑨𝑷𝑬𝑿 𝒕𝒐 𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔𝒊𝒕 = 𝒂𝟎 + 𝒂𝟏 ∗ 𝑫𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒙𝒊𝒕 +  𝒂𝟐 ∗ 𝑮𝑫𝑷 𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒕 +
∑ 𝝁𝒊𝒏𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒚𝒏𝒏 +  ∑ 𝝀𝒊𝒋𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒋 + ∑ 𝝂𝒕𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕𝒋                                                                             (F3) 
Where CAPEX to Assetsit is the ratio of capital expenditure to assets of firm i in year t (all other 
variables are the same as with F1). 
4. Results and Analysis 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table IV presents the summary statistics for the key financial metrics, including the number 
of useable observations, the mean value as well as the standard deviation of each metric. 
Financial data were obtained from Bloomberg, and relevant calculations were conducted by the 
authors. 
Table IV. Descriptive statistics of the financial variables 
Financial Metric N Min Mean Max Std. Deviation 
Net Income / Revenues (%) 375 -128,14 9.55 53,16 14.06 
Revenues / Assets 375 0,10 0.60 2,33 0.48 
CAPEX / Assets 213 0,00 0.06 0,29 0.05 
Return on Assets (%) 375 -21,13 4.04 42,16 5.07 
 
Table V presents the summary statistics of the OECD indicators of regulation for each country 
included in the analysis, including the number of useable observations, the mean as well as the 
standard deviation for each country. Data to build the research specific index were obtained from 
the OECD database, and the authors conducted relevant calculations.  
Table V. Descriptive statistics of OECD indicators of regulation 
Country N Min Mean Max Std. Deviation 
Austria 39 1,46 3.6 4,01 1.4 
Belgium 39 1,95 3.8 2,03 1.3 
Denmark 39 1,43 3.5 3,71 1.5 
Finland 39 2,72 4.0 4,55 1.1 
France 39 2,72 4.5 5,56 1.2 
Germany 39 1,36 3.8 3,26 1.9 
Greece 39 2,65 4.9 4,82 1.0 
Italy 39 2,58 4.8 5,85 1.3 
Latvia 39 2,28 2,28 2,28 ? 
Netherlands 39 1,55 3.6 3,05 1.6 
Portugal 39 3,03 4.6 5,21 1.2 
United Kingdom 39 1,02 2.6 1,31 1.2 
Source: Calculations by the author based on the OECD database (OECD, 2015).  
4.2 Regression results 
Error! Not a valid bookmark self-reference. presents the regression results and describes 
the relationship between the key financial attributes of a privatized firm as approximated by the 
relevant financial metrics, deregulation and the remaining explanatory variables as described 
above. We have used the SPSS 24 software to analyse and report these data. The results 
illustrated in this table are the unstandardized coefficients and standard errors respectively. 
Table VI.  Regression Results 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Dependent Variable 
Revenues to Assets (1) Net Income Margin (2) CAPEX to Assets (3) 
Deregulation Index 0.186*** 
(0.051) 
5.773*** 
(1.787) 
0.007 
(0.010) 
GDP Growth 0.006 
(0.009) 
0.530 
(0.332) 
0.008*** 
 (0.002) 
(Constant) 0.815*** 
(0.127) 
6.004 
(3.719) 
0.010  
(0.017) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Dummies Yes Νο Yes 
Adjusted R2 58.0% 25.6% 35.9% 
Observations 375 375 213 
F – Statistic 13,28*** 
(.000) 
4,289*** 
(.000) 
3,957*** 
(.000) 
* Figures represent unstandardized B, figures in brackets represent coefficient standard errors. *, **, *** is the 
significance level.   
This table presents the results of regressions on efficiency, profitability and investment 
activity respectively and the estimation is done via Ordinary Least Squares. The dependent 
variable is Revenues to Assets (1), Net Income Margin (2) and CAPEX to Assets (3). The 
independent variables consist of a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if firm i was privatized in 
a given year (0 otherwise), GDP Growth corresponds to the real GDP Growth for a given 
country/year, dummy variables distinguishing individual countries, years and sector types. The 
symbols ***, ** and * refer to estimates significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The fewer observations used in the 
CAPEX to Assets ratio was the result of more restricted available public data related with CAPEX 
for each firm. In certain models year, country and sector dummies offered additional explanatory 
power to the model. Thus, they were added to the models. It has to be mentioned that the F-
Statistic rejects the null hypothesis in all scenarios.  
Operating Efficiency 
The positive and statistically significant (at 1% significance level) Deregulation Index beta 
coefficient suggests that deregulation affects the privatized firms’ operating efficiency positively, 
confirming Hypothesis 1. The estimated effect on Revenue to Assets amounts to 19% on average.  
Profitability 
We find the Deregulation Index to be significantly associated with the Net Income Margin ratio 
at 1% significance level, suggesting that deregulation affects the privatized firms’ profitability 
positively. In particular, deregulation leads to a 5.7% mean increase in Net Income Margin. These 
results re-confirm Hypothesis 2 that deregulation affects the efficiency of the post-privatization 
company positively in transforming earnings to profits. 
Investment Activity Growth 
The values reported in Table VI indicates that there is no statistically significant difference in 
investment activity pre- and post-deregulation. Therefore, we can’t determine whether 
deregulation is positively associated with increased capital expenditure (CAPEX) in privatized 
European transport firms, based on these empirical results. 
4.3 Robustness of the results  
4.3.1 Alternative Model Formulation 
The key approach selected to test the robustness of the statistical results related to the 
privatized firms’ key financial ratios is by way of developing and using an independent measure 
of deregulation effects developed by OECD. The measure, an independent variable, replaces the 
time-dependent Deregulation Index. This measures a predefined set of economic regulations and 
considers the key regulatory and legal restrictions in the transport industry, such as entry 
barriers, public ownership, market structure, price regulation as well as vertical/horizontal 
integration (separation) assessment, hence smoothing any deregulation timing effects. This 
construct measures the industry wide effects of deregulation, as the metrics come from different 
sectors of the transport industry. The following three FEM functions, i.e., F4, F5, and F6 test the 
effect of the regulation intensity on the corresponding managerial efficiency, profitability and 
investment activity of privatized EU transport firms: 
Operating Efficiency: 
𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔𝒊𝒕 = 𝒂𝟎 + 𝒂𝟏 ∗ 𝑶𝑬𝑪𝑫 𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒙𝒊𝒕 +  𝒂𝟐 ∗ 𝑮𝑫𝑷 𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒕 +
∑ 𝝁𝒊𝒏𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒚𝒏𝒏 +  ∑ 𝝀𝒊𝒋𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒋 + ∑ 𝝂𝒕𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕𝒋                                                                 (F4) 
Profitability: 
𝑵𝒆𝒕 𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆 𝑴𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒕 = 𝒂𝟎 + 𝒂𝟏 ∗ 𝑶𝑬𝑪𝑫 𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒙𝒊𝒕 +  𝒂𝟐 ∗ 𝑮𝑫𝑷 𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒕 +
∑ 𝝁𝒊𝒏𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒚𝒏𝒏 +  ∑ 𝜺𝒊𝒕𝒋                                                                                                                     (F5) 
Investment Activity Growth: 
𝑪𝑨𝑷𝑬𝑿 𝒕𝒐 𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔𝒊𝒕 = 𝒂𝟎 + 𝒂𝟏 ∗ 𝑶𝑬𝑪𝑫 𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒙𝒊𝒕 +  𝒂𝟐 ∗ 𝑮𝑫𝑷 𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒕 +
∑ 𝝁𝒊𝒏𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒚𝒏𝒏 +  ∑ 𝝀𝒊𝒋𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒋 + ∑ 𝝂𝒕𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕𝒋                                                                 (F6) 
Where OECD Regulation Indexit is a variable that ranges from 0 (fully deregulated) to 6 (fully 
regulated), and the other variables are the same with those in F1, F2, and F3 respectively. 
4.3.2 Alternative Model Results 
Table VII demonstrates the regression results and describes the relationship between the 
managerial efficiency, profitability and investment activity of a privatized firm, the OECD index 
on deregulation and the remaining explanatory variables described above. The results illustrated 
in the table are the unstandardized coefficients and standard errors respectively. 
Table VII. OECD Index Hypothesis – Revenues to Assets Regression Results 
 
Explanatory Variables 
Dependent Variable 
Revenues to Assets 
(OECD) 
Net Income 
Margin (OECD) 
CAPEX to 
Assets (OECD) 
OECD Regulation Index -0.208*** 
(0.071) 
-1.462** 
(0.728) 
-0.007 
(0.020) 
GDP Growth 0.036*** 0.493** 0.010*** 
(0.012) (0.221)  (0.003) 
(Constant) 0.701*** 
(0.203) 
15.866*** 
(2.528) 
0.050 
(0.056) 
Year Dummies Yes No Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Dummies Yes No Yes 
Adjusted R2 57.9% 26.5% 42.7% 
Observations 334 334 186 
F-Statistic 12,185*** 
(0.000) 
10,259*** 
(0.000) 
4,542*** 
(0.000) 
 
This table presents the results of regressions on efficiency, profitability and investment 
activity and the estimation is done via Ordinary Least Squares. The dependent variable is 
Revenues to Assets, Net Income Margin and CAPEX to Assets. The independent variables consist 
of the OECD Regulation Index, a variable which ranges from 0 to 6 depending on the level of 
regulation at a given country/time, GDP Growth corresponds to the real GDP Growth for a given 
country/year, dummy variables distinguishing individual countries, years and sector types. The 
symbols ***, ** and * refer to estimates significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively. Coefficients’ standard errors are shown in parentheses. The fewer observations 
used for the metrics Revenues to Assets and Net Income Margin resulted from the (un)availability 
of the OECD Deregulation Index data; data for this index are available only for years up to 2013 
and for specific countries. The fewer observations used in the metric CAPEX to Assets was the 
result of more restricted available public data related with CAPEX for each firm. In certain models, 
year, country and sector dummies offered additional explanatory power to the model; thus they 
were added to the models. The F-Statistic rejects the null hypothesis in all scenarios.  
Concerning the Revenues to Assets metric, the negative and statistically significant OECD 
Regulation Index beta coefficient suggests that the reduction of the index (i.e., market 
deregulation) leads to improved privatized firms’ operating efficiency, reiterating the conclusion 
reached concerning Hypothesis 1. Similarly, the evidence in Table VII. above strongly supports 
the view that market deregulation leads to improved privatized firms’ profitability. In particular, 
the negative and statistically significant OECD Regulation Index beta coefficient suggests that the 
reduction of the index leads to improved privatized firms’ profitability, supporting our conclusion 
about Hypothesis 2. Regarding the investment activity, it is deduced that the OECD Regulation 
Index beta coefficient is statistically insignificant. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that 
deregulation is positively associated with increased investment activity and capital expenditure 
(CAPEX) in privatized European transport firms, in line with our earlier conclusions.  
5. Discussion 
This analysis provides some useful insights as to how efficient the transport companies are post-
privatization, filling an important gap in the literature. More precisely the hypotheses set (1 and 
2) with regards to operating efficiency and profitability were all confirmed by the empirical 
results. The effect on the investment activity of the companies post regulation has found no 
support by the evidence.  
As per suggestions in literature review, e.g., (Boubakri & Cosset, 1998), (Megginson, et al., 
1994), (Sheshinski, 2003), (Megginson & Netter, 2001), (D’Souza & Megginson, 1999), transport 
companies post-privatization seem to use resources more effectively compared to pre-
privatization in the EU transport industry since privatized companies have more incentives to 
increase profitability in order to cope with both market forces and investor requirements. Based 
on this analysis, deregulation within the same industry has a positive effect on the operating 
efficiency and the profitability indices of the privatized firm as per the expectations. The extent 
of the effect deregulation exercises on the operating efficiency and the profitability varies. This 
could be due to pre-privatization inefficiencies that the new ownership was called to handle, for 
instance, labor policies and employment schemes, new strategies and the time it takes to devise 
and implement them, inertia, or high costs for efficiently utilizing legacy equipment.  
Nevertheless, it is well noted that even in the presence of these issues, deregulation affected 
the profitability of the companies and the operating efficiency positively. This confirms the theory 
that a private owner puts effort to optimize the usage of the inputs whereas the state-owned 
companies have different strategic objectives. Regarding Hypothesis 3, it should be noted that 
the results contradict the experience from other industries, for example, the Telecoms Industry, 
where the privatized companies invested heavily to modernize their networks and to offer new 
innovative services, including Next Generation Networks, 4th and 5th Generation Mobile 
Networks, Fiber-to-the-home, etc. This finding may be attributed to the inherent characteristics 
of the transport industry itself.  Notably, the competition in the transport sector is much more 
intense since post-deregulation and post-privatization new participants enter and offer services 
directly competing the incumbents. In relevant industries (telecoms, energy/gas), competition, 
although intense, is geographically limited which is not the case for the transport sector, where 
for example two ports in two different countries compete directly for the same hinterland.  
Furthermore, the transport “product” is considered as a commodity with little innovation 
needed by the “consumers” and with little or no difference at all. Similarly, the technological 
advances in the transport sector are limited at the moment. For example the main mega trends 
include the containerships’ enlargement / mega ships, the potential to widespread use of new 
fuels and the introduction of advanced ICT technologies. In any case, the scale of the capital 
investment is very large for the capabilities of the transport companies and the 2007-2008 fiscal 
crisis has affected many investment plans. The financial community has since become stricter 
and more selective in participating in large scale transport projects. Thus the intensification of 
transport industry-wide competition doesn’t push companies to increase their investment but 
the companies instead adopt more risk-averse strategies.  
The transport sector was the last one to be deregulated and as such newer data will 
significantly improve our understanding of long-term decision making. For comparison reasons, 
the telecom industry started being deregulated in the early 1990s and the energy industry started 
around mid-1990s. Contrary to that, the transport industry started being deregulated in EU in 
the early 2000s. 
In summary, these results suggest that privatized firms tend to focus more on short-term 
decision making as a means to improve their operating efficiency and their profitability, that is, 
to optimize the resource consumption. The results confirm the expectations (ECMT, 1989) that 
market agents seem to adapt rather quickly their decisions to market deregulation and “[…] 
market […] reacts with only a short time lag”. On the other hand, long-term decision making, 
regarding indicatively new investments, upgrading of infrastructure, purchase of new equipment 
is put aside as the empirical evidence suggests. These two findings suggest that the deregulated 
companies do not engage on regulatory opportunism (Lyon & Mayo, 2005), that is, execute 
strategies with significant divestiture/disinvestment and decrease of profits and operating 
efficiency. On the other hand, the Regulators, ought to make provisions to closely monitor not 
only the short-term viability of the transport industry incumbents but most importantly both the 
long term viability as well as the growth potential and the innovation adoption.  
6. Conclusions and recommendations 
6.1 Theoretical contributions 
This research contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First of all, we update the 
economic theory of regulation in examining the impact of deregulation on the managerial 
performance of EU transport companies.  This paper captures important insight on the corporate 
level regarding business strategies employed through understanding the impact that 
deregulation had on the transport industry. Our results empirically confirm the expectations that 
the deregulation process, in the short term pushes privatized transport companies to optimize 
their operating efficiency and profitability. However in the longer term, these companies appear 
to be risk averse and do not increase their capital expenditure by not investing more compared 
to pre-privatization. Secondly, we introduce a comparison of the effects of deregulation on 
different components of the managerial efficiency, namely, investment, profitability, and 
operating efficiency of the incumbents in the EU transport industry. Thirdly, we examined 
deregulation by using two approaches: a traditional one where deregulation is a dummy variable 
assessing the overall effect on incumbents’ efficiency performance; a novel approach where 
OECD’s deregulation index is used to measure the regulation intensity. This two-sided approach 
increases the robustness of the results.  
6.2 Devising the Strategic Adaptation Matrix 
Based on the previous discussion, it is safe to propose the following matrix ( 
), which encapsulates the decision making at the corporate level after privatization of the 
companies participating in the panel. This matrix is based on the statistical inferences from the 
previous analysis both for short as well as for the long term. On the horizontal axis, the decision 
horizon differentiates between short term and long-term decision-making. Decisions affecting 
the profitability, the revenue streams, and similar management aspects are short term, whereas 
decisions affecting the business, in the long run, include capital investment. For example, the 
number of vehicle-trips or the number of shifts in a transport company affects the revenues and 
the profitability on an annual basis. Buying new equipment (e.g., railcars) affect the company in 
the long run.  
Similarly, on the vertical axis, the impact is distinguished in sectoral and an industry-wide 
impact. For example, the privatization of the railways’ dominant carrier affects the same sector. 
However, this also affects the industry level as the road, and the inland waterways sectors are 
also affected. The models addressing the main hypotheses discussed previously (F1-F3) cover the 
intra-sectoral deregulation, whereas the alternative models (F4-F6, referring to the robustness 
test) cover the inter-sectoral deregulation since these are using cross-sectoral regulatory impact.  
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Figure 1.Post Deregulation/Privatization Strategic Adaptation Matrix for the Panel Companies 
In summary and based on the previous analysis, this 2x2 matrix in Figure 1 offers a distinct view 
of the different decisions the participating companies post-privatization took based on the 
decision horizon. More precisely, the following observations are drawn:  
i. Deregulation on the sector level. In the short run, the company optimizes both operating 
efficiency and profitability; in the long-run, the company investigates sector dynamics to 
understand its competitive position and attempts to adjust to the new competitive 
landscape that is created from the deregulation. Capital expenditure tends to remain the 
same, indicating that the investment plan doesn’t change.  
ii. Deregulation on the industry level, based on the OECD – ETCR indicator (impact at the 
cross-sectoral level). Similarly to the above, on the short run, the privatized company tries 
to improve operating efficiency and gain as much revenue as possible as well as to 
improve profitability to defend its market share and market position compared to the 
industry-wide cross-modal competition. On the long run, the deregulated transport 
company tries to understand the dynamics in the market so as to adjust its profitability 
to cross-modal competition, and also in order to fine-tune its capital expenditure to the 
industry-wide post-deregulation effects. Similarly to the short run decision-making, 
Capital expenditure tends to remain the same pre- and post-deregulation, indicating that 
the investment plan doesn’t change.  
6.3 Policy Implications 
Based on the analysis, certain policy implications have to be successfully addressed by policy 
makers in order to improve the transport industry structure as a whole post-deregulation. We 
raise some key suggestions to policymakers. First, deregulation is inevitably incomplete when 
exercised on complicated transport systems, which include infrastructure, more than one modes 
of transport competing one-another and significant intra- and inter-market competitive forces. 
Second, the transport sector/transport industry is inherently risky due to the large economies of 
scale and scope and as such incentives should be provided but also carefully monitored for cross-
industry spillovers. Third, the deregulatory initiatives should ensure non-discrimination for all 
market players and equal access to infrastructure, including essential and critical infrastructure. 
Fourth, regulators should provide a robust framework that can cope with external 
(“unexpected”) shocks. Finally, information availability should be ensured, with strict 
requirements to publicize key data, especially in essential infrastructure or in monopolistic 
bottlenecks.  
6.4 Further Research  
We acknowledge the limitations of this research regarding scope; there is still a long way to 
further understand implications at the business level and to further contribute to the 
understanding at the corporate and market level. More precisely, a more inclusive model may be 
devised, addressing both business and technical efficiency, backed up by empirical evidence. 
Additionally, cross-sectoral analyses of the transport sector are also needed to identify both the 
actual deregulatory effects and also the implications from/to other transport modes as well as 
understand what the optimal regulatory restrictions should be. Conclusively, transport industry 
deregulation, as a very complex subject, has important implications to all economic sectors, and 
as such, a deeper understanding of the impact of the deregulatory initiatives on the transport 
industry and their spillovers to other industries is required.  
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